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This paper investigates the effect that experience and diversification board have on short-term 
acquisition returns for investors. Additionally, it assesses whether the crisis changed the effect that 
board characteristics have on the short-term acquisition returns. It is found that several board 
experience characteristic do result in higher short-term acquisition returns for investors when 
taking the crisis into account these returns mainly persist in the post-crisis era, but not anymore in 
the pre-crisis era. For board diversification on the other hand, not many effects are found. The 
main finding here is that more woman on a board improves the short-term acquisition returns.  
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Acquisitions have always been a vital part of the professional business environment. They make 
sure that bad performing companies are acquired and make a shift in performance. Additionally, 
they make sure that efficiencies are created by combining synergies and improving operation 
efficiency. It is therefore not surprising that in periods prior to the crisis a vast sum of money was 
spend on acquisitions, in 2007 in the US alone was more than $4 trillion spend on acquiring 
companies (Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos, 2012). The final decision in making these 
acquisitions lies with the board of a company. They in the end are responsible for the direction a 
company follows and especially with a major decision like an acquisition, they will be heavily 
involved. Hence, the board of directors should have a major impact on the acquisitions a company 
pursues. Another important stakeholder group that pays a large amount of interest to acquisitions 
are investors, who will benefit if acquisitions are performing well. Alternatively, they will refrain 
from investing in companies that are pursuing bad mergers.  
Thus, the focus of this study is to analyze what board characteristics affects the gains, or returns, 
for investors when a company performs acquisitions. Due to the large nature of stock returns the 
focus of this paper solely lies on the short-term returns of a stock around the announcement date 
of an acquisition. This might not be as relevant for passive long-term investors, but is extremely 
important for active investors, since they heavily depend on such small fluctuations around 
announcement dates of acquisitions to improve their gains. Knowing what effect a board has on 
these gains might therefore provide them with extra information, thus the central research focus of 
this paper is: ‘What board characteristics generate short-term acquisition value?’ 
In order to assess the board characteristics they are subdivided into two categories of which the 





manage to acquire companies which result in more synergies and higher operational gains. 
Therefore, the acquisitions of these companies should be met with a positive market perception 
and increase in the share price after the announcement of such an acquisition. The second category 
is the board’s diversification. It is assumed that the more diversified a board is, the more situations 
it has dealt with and total experience it has present, and therefore that this also has a positive impact 
on the engagement in better acquisitions. Thus, the first two sub-questions of this research are: 
‘Does an experienced board generate short-term acquisition value?’ and ‘Does a diversified board 
generate short-term acquisition value?’ 
There is however one important factor that should be taken into consideration when analyzing 
these effects, namely: the crisis. The crisis acted as a wake-up call to investors that the market 
functioning was anything but efficient and that there were vast amounts of information which were 
hidden from investors, too difficult to comprehend or just not taken into consideration. Given that 
investors experienced large amount of losses given these results it should be checked whether the 
crisis affected any of the abovementioned effects of board characteristics on short-term acquisition 
value. Therefore, the two remaining sub-questions are: ‘Did the Financial Crisis impact the effect 
of an experienced board on short-term acquisition value?’ and ‘Did the Financial Crisis impact 
the effect of a diversified board on short-term acquisition value?’ 
In the next section, existing literature regarding these topics is observed. This is followed by a 
deep dive into the methodology, assumptions, sample collection and the observations utilized to 
perform this research. In section four the empirical results are analyzed. The paper ends with a 





2. Literature Review 
This research is composed from several strands of literature. Namely, research on board 
governance and merger and acquisition research. There is a large amount of measures on which 
board quality can be measured and accordingly an even larger amount of factors, which are 
influenced by board governance. Some research tends to combine general board quality into one 
index, such as the MSCI quality index (MSCI, 2018); this however, results in a single number, of 
which few assumptions can be drawn. Other research tends to split up measures of board 
governance, such as the research of Nicolò, Laeven and Ueda (2008), where measures such as 
earnings smoothing, price synchronicity and changes in accounting standards are assessed, this 
results in the ability to analyze the results and their influence far further in depth. The problem 
remains that it is still hard to assess what good and what bad corporate governance characteristics 
are, especially with the large number of characteristics that are available. Van den Berghe and 
Levrau (2004) have evaluated the effectiveness of a large number of characteristics regarding 
board quality and found that the quantifiable research is far too traditional and that in practice there 
is a far higher importance on barely researched soft elements. 
In recent years, several research has been performed on how to improve the board of directors. 
One of these strains of research argues that an increase in board diversity has a positive impact on 
the performance. Having more equal gender diversity presence improves the performance of a 
board (Brammer, Millington and Pavelin, 2009). This is in line with Ferrero, Izquierdo and Torres 
(2013) who argue for having more diversity in the ages of directors since it improves financial 
performance. Buse, Bernstein and Bilimoria (2014) argue that having a more international mixed 
board improved the effectiveness of board governance practices, thereby creating a better public 





several factors should most likely increase the overall performance, this is once again in line with 
previously conducted research by Brancato and Patterson (1999), where it is argues that overall 
board diversity improves shareholder value.  
Luckily, there is a vast amount of literature present regarding whether managers conduct bad 
mergers and acquisitions in order to engage in ‘empire building’ (Shi, Hoskisson and Zhang, 
2016). This shows that if governance is sub-optimal acquisitions are performed without having the 
shareholder in mind, but pure for personal gain. This is in line with the research by Qiu, Trapkov 
and Yakoub (2014) who argue that managers are even willing to pay premiums for mergers for 
their own personal gains, thereby foregoing shareholder gains. Moeler, Schlingemann and Stulz 
(2004) show the presence of merger waves and indicate that the merger wave of specifically 1990 
resulted in a large amount of shareholder value destruction. This teaches us two things: firstly, that 
merger characteristics are prone to changes over time, which should be taken into consideration 
when analyzing them. Secondly, that mergers can decrease shareholder value by simple factors 
such as the period in which they took place. Combining these two strains of literature should result 
in a situation where shareholder value should not be destroyed when good board characteristics 







3. Research Design 
3.1 Methodology 
At the basis of this research lies the theory of Market Efficiency (Fama, 1970). When a company 
announces to acquire another company for a specific price, the market should react by valuing this 
deal with all available information. The change in the share price of a company around the 
acquisition date should therefore reflect the value that the market assigns to the acquisition. Given 
that the market is efficient, a deal is therefore immediately valued at the most accurate estimate, 
given the available information, and therefore there should be no reason to waste resources and re-
evaluate the deal.  
Given that deals will be valued at their correct price the aim of this research is to see if it is able to 
predict what the impact of board experience and diversification is on their ability to pick beneficial 
deals. Beneficial deals in this case are the deals which are deemed as valuable by the market, and 
which therefore result in a share price increase of the acquirer. An investors strategy, in which 
companies to invest, should change accordingly to board characteristics. If investors have 
knowledge on (sub-) optimal board characteristics they can predict which companies will make 
good (bad) deals, and should therefore be able to assign a higher (lower) value to the stock in their 
portfolio. The stock returns, which are the dependent variable in this research, are calculated as 
follows: 
  𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 =
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡+1𝑑𝑎𝑦−𝐴𝑐𝑞𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1𝑑𝑎𝑦
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1𝑑𝑎𝑦
   (1) 
  𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 =
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡+1𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘−𝐴𝑐𝑞𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1𝑑𝑎𝑦
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1𝑑𝑎𝑦
   (2) 
Where t is the acquisition announcement date. The reason why two different returns are assessed 
is in order to see if unexpected returns last beyond the initial shock of the announcement, or if they 





if they tend to last for a longer period in time, and do not require the urgency to be reacted upon 
immediately after an acquisition announcement. There should caution heeded with the longer week 
returns, since with an increasing time period there will be more external factors incorporated. 
3.2 Assumptions 
As stated before, the main underlying assumption of this research is the perfect market hypothesis 
(Fama, 1970). While it might be extreme to believe that the stock market price contains all 
information, it is a safe to say that the average assumption regarding the stock price is included in 
this number. A danger arises when a prolonged period of a bull- or bear-market persists, this results 
in the overall market being over- or under-valued. This however is not the focus of this research, 
even if an overall tendency exists to over- or under-valuate stocks, the returns can still be predicted 
by board characteristics. Therefore, it is beneficial for shareholders to have knowledge on the effect 
of board characteristics on the ability of a board to find good acquisitions. While in the long run a 
severe mispricing of a stock might impact the actual result of an acquisition, it is unlikely for the 
short run result to be affected by this. 
This research focuses solely on short-term returns and therefore day-traders. While according to 
the efficient market hypothesis the stock should be correctly priced after an acquisition, this does 
not take into consideration the inside information that the board might have on synergies of the 
stock. The market might consider these long-run expectations when valuing stocks, but these 
expectations will be inaccurate due to lack of information. It could be that in the long-run 
acquisitions could generate value by utilizing synergies unobservable by the market.  Once again, 
this is not the focus of this research and additional research should be assessed in order to see if 
board characteristics on experience and diversification influence the performance of acquisitions 





3.3 Sample and Data Transformation  
In this section, the sample sources and transformation thereof are discussed. The sample is 
constructed from the combination of two data sources. One regards acquisition information, the 
other contains information regarding the board composition. 
The board composition data is drawn from the WRDS BoardEx database (BoardEx, 2018). This 
database contains information on individual board members of listed companies per annual report. 
From this database information for each director is drawn: sex, nationality, time in the current 
company, time in other companies, time on the board, time on other boards, time performing the 
current role, number of listed and unlisted boards currently sitting on and sat on and the network 
size of each director (number of overlaps through employment, other activities, and education). 
This data is then transformed in order to assess the boards: male ratio; defined as the proportion of 
directors which are male, nationality ratio; defined as the proportion of directors with different 
nationality with respect to the majority of the board, mean and standard deviation of the other 
variables and the total sum of the network size over the board per annual report. 
The acquisition data is retrieved from the SDC platinum M&A database (SDC Platinum, 2018). 
The withdrawn information contains: the acquisition announcement date, the acquirers closing 
stock price one day pre-announcement, the acquirers closing stock price one day and one week 
post-announcement, the acquirers industry, the amount of equity involved and the amount in the 
deal and the enterprise value of the targeted company. Four requirements are imposed on the data 
withdrawal process for it to share similarities with the research of Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007): 
First, the acquirer is a publicly traded company and has stock returns available from one day prior 
to the acquisition announcement up to one week after the announcement. Second, the acquisition 





company. Fourth, there is a match for the company present in the BoardEx database, this entails 
that the annual report in which the board information was published is not older than one year prior 
to the acquisition announcement. Because the resulting acquirers spread across 54 unique 
industries, they are reclassified according to the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS), 
which is a global academic standard for industry sectors (MSCI, 2018), in order to control for 
industries. The entire real estate sector is removed at this point, since it only contains nine data 
points.  
Since stock returns tend to show extreme outliers, it is important that these are ignored, since they 
might heavily interfere with the results of the research. Hence, the bottom and top 1% of both the 
short- and long-returns, calculated as shown in formula 1 and 2, are winsorized. A total of 1,857 
acquisitions remains with announcements ranging from 2000 to 2016. Table 1 summarizes the 
boards and acquisition characteristics. The enterprise value and equity value offered inhabit 
extreme differences, but this is due to the fact that the enterprise value does not imply how much 
equity the actual company is worth, since a large part of it might be debt, which should not be paid 
for. This is in line with the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1970 & Samuelson, 1965). 
Additionally, the mean of both the one day and one week post-announcement acquirer closing 
stock price seems to lie marginally below the mean of the one day pre-announcement acquirer 
closing stock price. This is in line with previous research that underlines that mergers generally do 
not generate sustainable growth (Marimuthu and Kolandaisamy, 2009), hence investors will have 
a certain degree of wariness towards acquisitions.  
The board compositions share similarities with research utilizing the Investors Responsibility 
Research Center (Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas, 2010). Male and nationality ratio both show 





see whether these results are industry dependent. This does not seem the case however, the 
diversification of boards regarding either nationality or sex seems to be lackluster in all industries, 
in line with earlier research (Carter, D’Souza, Simkins & Simpson, 2010). According to Rao & 
Reddy (2015) the performance of acquisitions was severely impacted by the financial crisis. 
Consequent impact on the frequency, equity value and enterprise value of acquisitions can be 
observed in appendix B. After the start of the crisis, which is assessed as the start of the housing 
market fall (Claessens, Laeven, Igan and Dellaricia, 2010), it can be seen that all three variables 
drop. 
Summary Statistics 
Statistic Mean Standard 
Deviation 
25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 
Acquisition Statistics      
EnterpriseValueDeal 2,189.271 1,259.633 1,141.2 2,152 3,272.8 
EquityValueDeal 1,987.042 5,877.416 91.576 330.816 1,384.163 
AcqClosingPrice1DayPreAnn 38.840 56.649 14.415 28.498 46.127 
AcqClosingPrice1DayPostAnn 38.973 57.073 14.569 28.445 46.987 
AcqClosingPrice1WeekPostAnn 38.828 56.349 14.485 28.595 46.277 
Board Statistics      
MaleRatio 0.886 0.094 0.818 0.889 1.000 
NationalityRatio 0.105 0.173 0.000 0.000 0.200 
NumberDire 10.287 3.168 8.000 10.000 12.000 
NetworkSize_Mean 1,330.847 970.355 624.246 1,087.991 1,758.639 
NetworkSize_SD 1,018.523 671.966 561.245 914.210 1,280.302 
NetworkSize_sum 14,295.490 12,701.760 5,670.2 10,361 18,278.5 
TimeBrd_Mean 7.674 3.630 5.129 7.500 9.985 
TimeBrd_SD 5.312 3.198 2.978 5.041 7.297 
TimeInCo_Mean 8.397 4.067 5.478 8.261 10.927 
TimeInCo_SD 5.907 3.633 3.165 5.626 8.346 
TimeRetire_Mean 8.271 4.108 5.578 7.958 10.672 
TimeRetire_SD 7.394 2.267 5.857 7.077 8.701 
TimeRole_Mean 6.127 2.946 4.035 5.975 7.779 
TimeRole_SD 4.521 2.653 2.576 4.335 6.052 
AvgTimeOth_Mean 3.651 1.999 2.281 3.546 4.900 
AvgTimeOth_SD 3.798 2.142 2.443 3.443 4.745 
TotCurrNoL_Mean 2.079 1.969 1.400 1.923 2.444 
TotCurrNoL_SD 1.051 0.871 0.632 0.982 1.339 
TotCurrNoU_Mean 2.121 1.039 1.500 1.875 2.426 





TotNoLstdB_Mean 3.460 2.466 2.111 3.300 4.452 
TotNoLstdB_SD 2.207 1.473 1.252 2.045 2.946 
TotNoUnLst_Mean 4.865 2.245 3.400 4.500 5.875 
TotNoUnLst_SD 3.840 2.550 2.193 3.314 4.690 
Table 1: Summary Statistics. This table reports the results from the summary characteristics of the analyzed data.  The data regards 
North-American data and ranges from 2000 to 2016. EnterpriseValueDeal is the multiplication of target actual shares outstanding 
by the offer price in addition to the cost to acquire convertible securities, short-term debt, straight debt, and preferred equity minus 
cash and marketable securities, stated in millions. EquityValueDeal is the multiplication of the target actual shares outstanding by 
the offer price. AcqClosingPrice1DayPreAnn is the acquirer’s closing price one day prior to the acquisition announcement. 
AcqClosingPrice1DayPostAnn is the acquirer’s closing price one day after the acquisition announcement. 
AcqClosingPrice1WeekPostAnn is the acquirer’s closing price one week after the acquisition announcement. The MaleRatio 
indicates the proportion of male directors. The NationalityRatio indicates the proportion of directors from different countries 
observed versus the biggest nationality group in a board. NumberDire shows the amount of directors in a board. The remaining 
characteristics are all calculated based upon the mean, standard deviation or sum of the entire board. Networksize is the network 
of a director (employment, other activities and education overlap). TimeBrd is the time the director has been sitting on the board. 
TimeInCo is the time the director has been in the company. TimeRetire is the assumed retiremed age of 70 minus the age of the 
director. TimeRole is the time the director has been performing their current role. AvgTimeOth is the average time a director has 
been on boards. TotCurrNoL is the amount of listed boards the director is currently in. TotCurrNoU is the amount of unlisted 
boards the director is currently in. TotNoLstdB is the amount of listed boards the director sat on in total. TotNoUnLst is the amount 
of unlisted boards the director sat on in total. 
 
Figure 1: Average Male Board Ratio by Industry of the sample. Average Male Board Ratio indicates the average proportion of 
male directors. 
 
Figure 2: Average Nationality Board Ratio by Industry of the Sample. Average Nationality Board Ratio indicates the average 







4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Effect of Board Experience on short-term acquisition returns 
In order to assess the effect of board experience on the capabilities of the board to pick acquisitions 
that are deemed well by the market, all the means are taken from the summary statistics as 
independent variables. Additionally, the effect of the number of directors is assessed since more 
directors imply that there is more experience present in the board. On top of this is the sum of all 
the networks of directors together observed, in order to see if a total larger circle of contacts has a 
positive effect on the board acquisition picking performance. Lastly, the entire model is controlled 
for the equity and enterprise value involved (Avery, Chevalier and Schaefer, 1998) and for the 
individual industries (Chon, Choi, Barnett, Danowski and Joo, 2003) the results of this model can 
be observed in table 2.  
An interesting observation straight away is that no variables apart from the number of directors 
are significant anymore for the one-week returns. This is most likely because a large amount of 
noise arises after an acquisition announcement, and the board experience characteristics are too 
minor to provide any clear reasoning on performance given the amount of noise. The one-day 
returns however do show some interesting results. The average network size per director has a 
positive impact on the returns, implying that having more connections results in investors, which 
have more experience and ability to pick stocks. Surprisingly, the board’s sum of the total network 
shows almost exactly the opposite result. It might be because having a large total network for the 
board might cause so much noise that the board is actually misinformed (Kim, 2005). The last 
significant value here is the time to retirement; the negative sign here is quite surprising, since one 
would expect that directors who are closer to retirement to be less invested in the performance of 





variable, which is the average age of the director, since the variable only measures the expected 
retirement age of 70 minus the age of the director. Hence a negative sign also indicates that having 
older directors results in better returns. This is in line with the expectation that having more 
experience improves the ability to pick quality acquisitions (McIntyre and Murphy, 2008). 
When the control variables are assessed, some interesting additional results show up. While it is 
not relevant for the current research focus, industry sectors do have a clear impact on short-term 
acquisition returns. Since all industry coefficients are negative or insignificant it seems to be that 
the consumer discretionary industry has higher short-term acquisition returns. Additionally, as 
expected according to Avery, Chevalier and Schaefer (1998) the enterprise value of a deal does 
not have an effect on the short term returns, the equity value however does, in line with the empire 
building theory. This indicates that boards might be targeting bigger firms for the sake of creating 
a bigger company, and not for shareholder benefits (Shi, Hoskisson and Zhang, 2016). 
Experience-Governance Effects on short-term acquisition returns 
 Dependent variable: 
 Returns ReturnsLong 
Independent Experience Variables   
NumberDire 0.001 0.005** 
TimeInCo_Mean -0.001 -0.007 
TimeBrd_Mean 0.00001 0.006 
TimeRole_Mean 0.001 0.004 
NetworkSize_Mean 0.00001*** 0.00001 
NetworkSize_Sum -0.00000** -0.00000 
AvgTimeOth_Mean -0.0004 -0.003 
TotNoLstdB_Mean -0.003 -0.003 
TotCurrNoL_Mean 0.003 0.003 
TotNoUnLst_Mean 0.001 -0.002 
TotCurrNoU_Mean -0.002 -0.001 
TimeRetire_Mean -0.001** -0.001 
Control Variables   
DealEquityValue -0.00000*** -0.00000 





Dummy.ConsumerStaples -0.014 -0.014 
Dummy.Energy -0.041*** 0.056** 
Dummy.Financials -0.023*** -0.041** 
Dummy.Healthcare -0.016*** -0.022 
Dummy.Industrials -0.015** -0.010 
Dummy.InformationTechnology -0.012** -0.008 
Dummy.Materials -0.021*** -0.004 
Dummy.TelecommunicationServices -0.001 -0.0001 
Dummy.Utilities -0.009 -0.016 
Constant 0.007 0.015 
R2 0.044 0.016 
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.003 
Residual Std. Error (df = 1830) 0.056 0.215 
F Statistic (df = 23; 1830) 3.623*** 1.271 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 2: Experience-Governance Effects on short-term acquisition returns. NumberDire is the amount of directors in a board.  For 
the further Experience Variables either the mean or the sum of a board is calculated. TimeBrd is the time the director has been 
sitting on the board. TimeInCo is the time the director has been in the company. TimeRetire is the assumed retiremed age of 70 
minus the age of the director. TimeRole is the time the director has been performing their current role. AvgTimeOth is the average 
time a director has been on boards. TotCurrNoL is the amount of listed boards the director is currently in. TotCurrNoU is the 
amount of unlisted boards the director is currently in. TotNoLstdB is the amount of listed boards the director sat on in total. 
TotNoUnLst is the amount of unlisted boards the director sat on in total. The data is controlled for equity, enterprise and industries 
involved, the base industry is Consumer Discretionary. 
4.2. Effect of Board Diversification on short-term acquisition returns  
This section analyzes the effect of board diversification the capabilities of boards to pick 
acquisitions which result in positive post-announcement returns. In contrast to the previous 
section, here the standard deviation of the board characteristics is analyzed. It is important to keep 
in mind that this is not the standard deviation of previously stated means, but instead the standard 
deviation per board as an independent variable. 
In order to assess the effect of board diversification on the capabilities of the board to pick 
acquisitions that are deemed well by the market all the standard deviations from individual boards 
are analyzed. Additionally, the effect of the ratio of males and nationality in measured, since both 
of these factors should result in a more heterogeneous board. Once again, the number of directors 
is added to the model, since a larger number of directors should result in more different 





value involved and for the individual industries in a similar style as previous section. The results 
of this model can be observed in table 3.  
Interestingly, the results of a diversified board do not seem very impactful on the ability of the 
board to pick beneficial acquisitions. The most important finding is the negative coefficient for 
male ratio, this indicates that the lower the male ratio, the better the performance, which is in line 
with Brammer, Millington and Pavelin (2009). As can be seen in figure 1, male ratio reaches close 
to 1 for every industry, therefore just adding more woman might reach a point of diminishing 
returns or even result in the opposite effect. Nevertheless, this point of adverse effects is seemingly 
not reached and more woman should certainly be beneficial given the large amount of males 
currently present in boards. As for the control variables, these are once again very similar to the 
board experience model used in the previous section. A higher equity value has once again a 
negative effect on the short-term acquisition returns. Whereas the consumer discretionary industry 
is again outperforming other industries on short-term acquisition returns. 
Diversification-Governance Effects on short-term acquisition returns 
 Dependent variable: 
 Returns ReturnsLong 
Independent Diversification Variables   
MaleRatio -0.038** -0.029 
NationalityRatio -0.008 -0.020 
NumberDire 0.0004 0.004* 
TimeInCo_SD -0.001 -0.003 
TimeBrd_SD -0.001 0.001 
TimeRole_SD 0.002 0.004 
NetworkSize_SD 0.00000 -0.00001 
AvgTimeOth_SD -0.0005 -0.001 
TotNoLstdB_SD -0.001 -0.003 
TotCurrNoL_SD -0.003 -0.011 
TotNoUnLst_SD 0.001 -0.0003 
TotCurrNoU_SD 0.001 0.002 





Control Variables   
DealEquityValue -0.00000*** -0.00000 
DealEnterpriseValue -0.00000 -0.00001 
Dummy.ConsumerStaples -0.016* -0.017 
Dummy.Energy -0.036*** 0.071*** 
Dummy.Financials -0.024*** -0.040** 
Dummy.Healthcare -0.013** -0.017 
Dummy.Industrials -0.013* -0.010 
Dummy.InformationTechnology -0.008 -0.004 
Dummy.Materials -0.017*** 0.0001 
Dummy.TelecommunicationServices -0.005 -0.006 
Dummy.Utilities -0.010 -0.019 
Constant 0.041** 0.029 
R2 0.041 0.018 
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.004 
Residual Std. Error (df = 1785) 0.055 0.216 
F Statistic (df = 24; 1785) 3.174*** 1.339 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 3: Diversification-Governance Effects on short-term acquisition returns. MaleRatio is the ratio of males on the board. 
NationalityRatio is the proportion of directors from different countries. NumberDire is the amount of directors in a board.  For the 
further Diversification Variables the standard deviation of a board is calculated. TimeBrd is the time the director has been sitting 
on the board. TimeInCo is the time the director has been in the company. TimeRetire is the assumed retiremed age of 70 minus the 
age of the director. TimeRole is the time the director has been performing their current role. AvgTimeOth is the average time a 
director has been on boards. TotCurrNoL is the amount of listed boards the director is currently in. TotCurrNoU is the amount of 
unlisted boards the director is currently in. TotNoLstdB is the amount of listed boards the director sat on in total. TotNoUnLst is 
the amount of unlisted boards the director sat on in total. The data is controlled for equity, enterprise and industries involved, the 
base industry is Consumer Discretionary. 
4.3. Effect of the Financial Crisis on relevance of board experience on returns 
As already stated in the data description: the crisis had severe impact on the frequency of 
acquisitions, equity value and enterprise value. The crisis was probably far more impactful and it 
has likely influenced investors’ weariness on factors influencing their returns (Guiso, Sapienza 
and Zingales, 2013). Therefore a dummy variable is added in order to assess pre- and post-crisis 
returns. Additionally, interaction variables are added to assess the change of each independent 
variable. The Post-Crisis dummy is assigned to acquisitions when their announcement date is older 
than October 15, 2007, this is the point at which point banks started to report heavy losses due to 





In table 4 the results of this model can be observed. As can be seen most of the pre-crisis 
coefficients are not significant, while five of the post-crisis interaction variables are significant. 
Possibly, there has been a shift within the boards after the crisis so that there is more importance 
upon these variables. This however seems unlikely, since there is no reason to believe that for 
example the time to retirement has a different internal effect on returns after the crisis. More likely 
however, is the fact that investors pay more attention to these variables and therefore inherently 
adjust the stock price of an acquisition based upon the board characteristics. The logic of the 
coefficients is still in line with the assumptions made in the assessment of the experience-
governance variables without the post-crisis dummies, even though this logic now only mostly 
holds for the post-crisis part of the dataset. 
Experience-Governance Effects on short-term acquisition returns, adjusted for crisis 

































Adjusted R2 0.011 
Residual Std. Error 0.056 (df = 1828) 
F Statistic 1.841*** (df = 25; 1828) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 4: Experience-Governance Effects on short-term acquisition returns, adjusted for crisis. NumberDire is the amount of 
directors in a board.  For the further Experience Variables either the mean or the sum of a board is calculated. TimeBrd is the 
time the director has been sitting on the board. TimeInCo is the time the director has been in the company. TimeRetire is the 
assumed retiremed age of 70 minus the age of the director. TimeRole is the time the director has been performing their current 
role. AvgTimeOth is the average time a director has been on boards. TotCurrNoL is the amount of listed boards the director is 
currently in. TotCurrNoU is the amount of unlisted boards the director is currently in. TotNoLstdB is the amount of listed boards 
the director sat on in total. TotNoUnLst is the amount of unlisted boards the director sat on in total. The variables which have 
“PostCrisis:” in front of them are interaction variables to see how their coefficients respond post-crisis. 
4.4. Effect of the Financial Crisis on relevance of board diversification on returns 
Similarly, to the previous section in this section, there is also a Post-Crisis model generated for 
the diversification-board characteristics with similar reasoning, namely that the crisis most likely 
had an impact in how companies were managed and that investors started paying more attention. 
Table 5 shows the result of this model, but extremely similar to the diversification model without 
the Post-Crisis dummy there are barely any significant coefficients in the model with the Post-
Crisis dummy. The only interesting observation is that a higher diversification of board time has 
a negative impact on the returns and a higher diversification of role time has a positive impact on 
the returns. Surprisingly this only holds prior to the crisis, Post-Crisis both coefficients are offset 
by the Post-Crisis interaction variables. This might indicate that prior to the crisis there was a 
large focus on the diversification of board members on the time in board and time in role, but 







Diversification-Governance Effects on short-term acquisition returns, adjusted for crisis 































Adjusted R2 0.002 
Residual Std. Error 0.056 (df = 1782) 
F Statistic 1.158 (df = 27; 1782) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Table 5: Diversification-Governance Effects on short-term acquisition returns, adjusted for crisis. MaleRatio is the ratio of males 
on the board. NationalityRatio is the proportion of directors from different countries. NumberDire is the amount of directors in a 
board.  For the further Diversification Variables the standard deviation of a board is calculated. TimeBrd is the time the director 
has been sitting on the board. TimeInCo is the time the director has been in the company. TimeRetire is the assumed retiremed age 
of 70 minus the age of the director. TimeRole is the time the director has been performing their current role. AvgTimeOth is the 
average time a director has been on boards. TotCurrNoL is the amount of listed boards the director is currently in. TotCurrNoU 
is the amount of unlisted boards the director is currently in. TotNoLstdB is the amount of listed boards the director sat on in total. 
TotNoUnLst is the amount of unlisted boards the director sat on in total. The variables which have “PostCrisis:” in front of them 






The results of this paper show that board governance certainly has a predictive factor in explaining 
the short-term returns on acquisition announcements of companies. This indicates that the board 
has an important role in how successful the market deems that the stock will be. If it is expected 
that a company will announce an acquisition, it might therefore be beneficial for investors to 
analyze the board composition in order to optimize the expected returns on the stock. Especially 
board experience has several integral factors that help explaining the short-term returns after an 
acquisition announcement. The main variables here being the network size of board members and 
the time to retirement, and inherently therefore also the age of the board members. Board 
diversification on the other hand can only be used to a marginal effect in order to predict short-
term acquisition returns. The main predictor in question here is the male ratio of a board.   
When these results are compared with the effect of the crisis, it can be observed that the crisis had 
a significant impact on the predictors of especially the governance experience. It turns out that 
post-crisis returns are far more impacted by board characteristics than pre-crisis returns. Indicating 
that board characteristics on their own might not indicate that companies can find better 
acquisitions, but that investors care about board characteristics post-crisis, and already incorporate 
this in valuing the acquisition itself post-crisis. This indicates the general weariness of investors in 
the post-crisis era to assess board characteristics with regards experience and diversification has 








6. Limitations and opportunities for future research 
A few limitations should be taken into consideration when assessing this research; these could be 
improved and implemented in further research. Firstly, it is extremely important to keep in mind 
that this research only assesses the short-term results of board characteristics; this means that this 
research is far more important for active investors than passive investors. No conclusions should 
be drawn based upon this research that assesses the overall implication of board characteristics on 
the general performance of an acquisition or the long-term implications for the company.  If one 
would want to assess the long-term effects of acquisitions, a dependent variable should be 
incorporated that assesses the effects over a longer period of time. Additionally, board 
characteristics over a longer period should be analyzed, since these there might be changes in the 
board.  
Secondly, due to the limitations in the dataset several board characteristics are not considered in 
this research, but should be taken into consideration if they are available in datasets that are more 
complete. One of these characteristics is the amount of independent versus dependent board 
members (Ramos, Díaz and Ollalla, 2017), important hereby however is to keep consideration that 
there is a thin line between the these two categories, and more often than not they might fall in a 
grey area. Another characteristic is the importance of education; one could try to find a dataset that 
incorporates the level of education and years of education per director (Phan, 2016).  
Lastly, does this research analyze the North-American market due to prevalence of data in this 
geographical area. Therefore, these results should be treated with caution when applied to other 
areas, since cultural differences might be present. In order to adjust for this a more complete dataset 
could be assembled where board and acquisition data is incorporated regarding the entire world. 
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EquityValueDeal AvgTimeOth MaleRatio NationalityRatio NetworkSize NumberDire TimeBrd TimeInCo TimeRetire TimeRole TotCurrNoL TotCurrNoU TotNoLstdB TotNoUnLst 
EnterpriseValueDeal 1.000               
                
EquityValueDeal 0.025 1.000              
 (0.280)               
AvgTimeOth -0.025 0.146* * * 1.000             
 (0.275) (0.000)              
MaleRatio 0.007 -0.129* * * -0.153* * * 1.000            
 (0.770) (0.000) (0.000)             
NationalityRatio -0.033 0.066* * 0.100* * * -0.034 1.000           
 (0.160) (0.005) (0.000) (0.138)            
NetworkSize -0.056* 0.215* * * 0.321* * * -0.325* * * 0.194* * * 1.000          
 (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)           
NumberDire 0.007 0.163* * * 0.116* * * -0.255* * * -0.001 0.157* * * 1.000         
 (0.749) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.955) (0.000)          
TimeBrd 0.041 -0.048* 0.078* * * 0.009 -0.115* * * -0.063* * 0.102* * * 1.000        
 (0.079) (0.037) (0.001) (0.683) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)         
TimeInCo 0.029 -0.027 0.099* * * -0.024 -0.106* * * -0.002 0.120* * * 0.961* * * 1.000       
 (0.205) (0.239) (0.000) (0.300) (0.000) (0.927) (0.000) (0.000)        
TimeRetire -0.044 -0.062* * -0.318* * * 0.066* * 0.051* 0.043 -0.163* * * -0.389* * * -0.374* * * 1.000      
 (0.060) (0.007) (0.000) (0.005) (0.028) (0.065) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
TimeRole 0.037 -0.040 0.081* * * -0.003 -0.115* * * -0.064* * 0.149* * * 0.912* * * 0.867* * * -0.381* * * 1.000     
 (0.107) (0.089) (0.001) (0.881) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
TotCurrNoL 0.003 0.044 0.224* * * -0.100* * * 0.089* * * 0.165* * * 0.009 -0.081* * * -0.070* * -0.003 -0.059* 1.000    
 (0.904) (0.060) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.709) (0.001) (0.002) (0.898) (0.011)     
TotCurrNoU -0.030 0.000 0.048* 0.067* * 0.129* * * 0.082* * * -0.132* * * -0.080* * * -0.092* * * 0.190* * * -0.055* 0.093* * * 1.000   
 (0.197) (0.990) (0.039) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000)    
TotNoLstdB -0.015 0.114* * * 0.360* * * -0.146* * * 0.192* * * 0.354* * * -0.006 -0.114* * * -0.103* * * -0.066* * -0.096* * * 0.902* * * 0.149* * * 1.000  
 (0.520) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.786) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
TotNoUnLst -0.042 0.015 0.163* * * 0.088* * * 0.212* * * 0.147* * * -0.134* * * -0.135* * * -0.158* * * 0.131* * * -0.126* * * 0.153* * * 0.630* * * 0.337* * * 1.000 
 (0.070) (0.524) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Table 6: Summary Statistics. This table reports the correlations of the summary characteristics of the analyzed data.  The data regards North-American data and ranges from 2000 
to 2016. EnterpriseValueDeal is the multiplication of target actual shares outstanding by the offer price in addition to the cost to acquire convertible securities, short-term debt, 
straight debt, and preferred equity minus cash and marketable securities, stated in millions. EquityValueDeal is the multiplication of the target actual shares outstanding by the offer 
price. The MaleRatio indicates the proportion of male directors. The NationalityRatio indicates the proportion of directors from different countries observed versus the biggest 
nationality group in a board. NumberDire shows the amount of directors in a board. The remaining characteristics are all calculated based upon the mean. Networksize is the 
network of a director (employment, other activities and education overlap). TimeBrd is the time the director has been sitting on the board. TimeInCo is the time the director has been 
in the company. TimeRetire is the assumed retiremed age of 70 minus the age of the director. TimeRole is the time the director has been performing their current role. AvgTimeOth 
is the average time a director has been on boards. TotCurrNoL is the amount of listed boards the director is currently in. TotCurrNoU is the amount of unlisted boards the director 








Figure 3: Frequency of acquisitions per year of the analyzed sample. 
 
Figure 4: Total equity value of all acquisitions combined per year of the analyzed sample. 
 
Figure 5: Total enterprise value of all acquisitions combined per year of the analyzed sample. 
 
 
 
 
